This is especially evident in its relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbia has consistently sought to assert dominance, often disregarding and undermining Bosnia’s sovereignty.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were officially established on October 3, 1996, when Slobodan Milošević, then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Alija Izetbegović, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Presidency, signed a joint statement in Paris. One notable clause, Article IV, stated: “The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will respect the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, which affirmed the continuity of various forms of statehood that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have had throughout their history.”

This agreement, signed in the presence of French President Jacques Chirac, soon revealed that Belgrade had no genuine intention of normalizing relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Milošević’s regime delayed the establishment of embassies and other diplomatic efforts.

Support for Separatism

In the years that followed, Serbia showed no willingness for catharsis or to strengthen relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, it focused on maintaining close ties with Republika Srpska (RS), one of Bosnia’s two entities.

By supporting separatist activities in Banja Luka through indirect and covert actions, Serbia persistently undermined its relations with Bosnia and its official institutions. A glaring example of this behavior is the continuous arrest of Bosnian citizens at border crossings, based on unfounded accusations of war crimes committed during the Bosnian War.

As part of its foreign policy strategy, Serbia uses its influence and the regime in Banja Luka to minimize or negate anything associated with Bosnian statehood. This clear denial of Bosnia’s sovereignty continues, despite Serbia, as the legal successor of Yugoslavia, having committed under Milošević to respect Bosnia’s historical statehood.

All-Serbian Assembly and Hegemony

Adhering to its hegemonic approach, Serbia recently held the “All-Serbian Assembly,” where the authorities in Belgrade and Banja Luka reaffirmed their adherence to the retrograde doctrine of Slobodan Milošević. Though the methods have evolved slightly, the ultimate goal of uniting “all Serbs” remains unchanged. The assembly’s 49-point declaration offers nothing new or surprising; it simply confirms that Aleksandar Vučić’s regime seeks to embolden Milorad Dodik and his allies to continue their established activities.

The declaration’s tone may be softer, but it is clear that the goals of Greater Serbia remain intact, merely postponed. The document’s content is problematic, as it does not serve Serbian interests but instead marginalizes and denies anything non-Serbian.

This is evident in points where Bosnia and Herzegovina is deliberately omitted, and only its Federation entity is mentioned. The declaration accuses others of undermining the Dayton Agreement but ignores violations by the secessionist regime in Banja Luka.

False claims that Republika Srpska holds authority on issues such as military neutrality or NATO membership, and the assertion that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not “one” (Article 21), are dangerous intrusions into Bosnia’s internal affairs. These claims show that Belgrade still cannot accept Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent, unified state, where foreign policy decisions are made in Sarajevo.

The Role of the Serbian Orthodox Church

One overlooked article of the declaration (Article 10) states: “The All-Serbian Assembly recognizes the Serbian Orthodox Church as one of the pillars of the national, cultural, and spiritual identity of the Serbian people.” This confirms the Church’s significant influence on Serbian political life and highlights the ruling elite’s theocratic tendencies in organizing both Republika Srpska and Serbia.

Given the Church’s importance in daily political life, its influence is expected to grow in the coming years. If Bosnia’s Bosniaks or the people of Sandžak were to emphasize the role of the Islamic Community of Bosnia in political processes similarly, the media in Belgrade would likely accuse them of promoting a supposed “green transversal.”

The “All-Serbian Assembly” and its declaration offer no surprises from the nationalist regimes in Belgrade and Banja Luka. What they do confirm is that the Greater Serbia ideology, or its rebranded “Serbian World” version, remains unchanged. Serbia shows no readiness for regional cooperation based on mutual respect and collaboration, as should be expected in this era of globalization.

Instead, Serbia continues to embrace regressive right-wing populist policies. While the world moves towards progress and interconnectedness, Serbia clings to outdated nationalist ideals. This trajectory will likely persist until democratic elites emerge in Belgrade and Banja Luka, replacing the current authoritarian leaders who base their programs on the principles of Svetosavlje.