Milorad Dodik’s referendum through the prism of game theory known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”

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“The Prisoner’s Dilemma” is a classic example from game theory that illustrates how two or more actors make decisions in situations where the interests of the individual and the collective are in conflict. Using this theory, the possible outcomes of Dodik’s political adventure regarding the holding of a referendum on the secession of the smaller Bosnian entity RS will be presented below. In the simplest theoretical version, this model includes two prisoners who are arrested and separated. Each is offered: To confess the crime against the partner or to remain silent. The outcome depends on the decision of both:

• If both remain silent, they are punished minimally.

• If one confesses and the other remains silent, the prisoner who confesses receives a reward (release), while the one who remains silent is punished maximally.

• If both confess, each of them receives a medium sentence.

This dilemma shows the key principle of the game that the rational decision of the individual does not necessarily lead to the best collective outcome. Although cooperation would be more beneficial for all, individual interest often leads to an unfavorable result for both sides. The essence is that the one who makes the move does not know the reaction of the other, and therefore cannot be certain of the final outcome. In the political context, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” helps to understand the behavior of states or leaders, where the strategic decisions of one actor (in our case Dodik’s potential referendum) can have unexpected consequences for all involved parties, even for the initiator of the referendum whose intention is the preservation of his own power or political position. Let us recall the words of the former member of the Presidency of BiH, Dr. HarisSilajdžić, who said that processes can be initiated, but their outcomes cannot be controlled, and in the same way Dodikstrives to initiate a process whose outcome may be counterproductive both for him personally and for the entity on whose behalf he can no longer act legally.

Referendum retrospective

Milorad Dodik, former president of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity RS, in the last two decades from time to time uses announcements of holding referendums on various issues as a political instrument. In this way, he tests the patience of the international community as well as the domestic public, in order to ultimately hold that key referendum for the secession of the smaller Bosnian entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also refers to the referendums in the republics of the former Yugoslavia although that comparison has no points of contact with what he wants, because the entity he governed is neither a republic nor, according to the Constitution of BiH, of which it is an integral part, does it have the right to secede. The examples of the declarations of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s had the full support of the international community expressed through the BadinterCommission, which is also confirmed by the massive recognition of the independence of those republics by the superpowers and other states from all continents. Even in that case, although the republics had strong support of international and military factors, the then Belgrade regime launched devastating wars in Croatia and BiH, while Slovenia fared somewhat better with a ten-day armed conflict. Today, however, Dodik’s potential referendum has neither constitutional foundation nor international consent as was the case in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Institutional and international mechanisms limit the real power of such decisions, so it remains unclear how Dodik and those who support him are not aware of it. The threat of a referendum, instead of strengthening the smaller Bosnian entity, can become a threat to the very existence of the entity which is only an administrative unit within a unified and sovereign BiH. If to this we add the current geopolitical positions of Serbia and Russia from whom Dodikexpects support, and which are in opposition to the interests of the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as many other countries of the world, then it is almost certain that such a referendum would be a path to catastrophe both for Dodik and for the entity of which he was president. It is also raised the question whether Russia’s real interest in the Balkans is at all aligned with the plans of Dodik’sinternal policy.

Putting the Prisoner’s Dilemma Theory into a Model

A model based on the theoretical framework of “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” seeks to examine the potential outcomes of the referendum that Dodik announces, from the very possibility of its being held, all the way to the political and social consequences within the Bosnian entity RS, as well as the reactions on the international scene. The key question is whether the referendum will be held at all and, if it does take place, whether it will have an exclusively symbolic character or will be directed directly against the decisions of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that context, there arises the need to consider what positions and measures the international community would adopt. In addition, in what way, and whether, Serbia and Russia would become involved in the entire process, as they have not only a political but also a strategic role in regional dynamics. In this sense, this model enables a deeper understanding of the complex relations between internal political processes and geopolitical reflections.

Proposed model in theory: “Scenario – probability matrix”

At the center of the analysis are several possible scenarios that could arise from the idea of a referendum. Unlike the classic model with two actors, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” is here adapted to three players: the Bosnian entity RS, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the international community. Such a framework provides a more realistic picture of political dynamics, because the interaction between the Bosnian entity RS and BiH almost inevitably opens space for international reactions. It thus becomes clear that the referendum may in the short term bring Dodik a certain strengthening of position within his entity, but in the long term it carries risks of destabilization and international isolation, to the possible weakening of the support of allies and the introduction of sanctions, which can be fatal not only for Dodik but also for the smaller Bosnian entity. The table with which the model is presented further illustrates these relations. Along the rows are arranged variants from a symbolic to a confrontational referendum, and even the possibility of its complete abandonment, while the columns follow the reactions of the international community, from ignoring to sanctioning. In this way, the key message is visually highlighted: A symbolic referendum may bring short-term benefits, but in the long run it opens considerably greater risks for the Bosnian entity RS and its leader.

Actor 1: Bosnian entity RS – referendum

Actor 2: State of BiH

Actor 3: International community

Conclusion

By considering the overall situation in the given international circumstances, it points to the fact that Dodik’s potential referendum is not an instrument with the same legal and political weight as the referendums in the former Yugoslavia. Although it temporarily and symbolically strengthens his political power, inadequate assessment of international and regional circumstances can turn it into a serious threat to the very entity structure of BiH. By applying game theory and the scenario model, it is clear that a certain move by an individual (in this case Dodik) does not necessarily result in the best collective outcome (in this case the Bosnian entity RS), whereby the referendum becomes a typical example of a political “double-edged sword.” The international order after the 1990s has undergone significant geopolitical changes, and therefore the circumstances in the Balkan region are no longer the same. The wars in the former Yugoslavia were a reflection, above all, of global movements and transformations, the consequences of which particularly affected the weakest links in Europe. Today, there are no such dramatic political changes in Europe, such as the “final victory of liberalism over communism,” that could provoke a similar resonance as in the last decade of the 20th century. The truth is that the outcome of the war in Ukraine in a certain variant may influence the situation in Southeast Europe if that is indeed the strategic goal of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. However, in all variants Dodik would more likely be used and pay the political price, than achieve any benefit for the wider community which he claims to represent. He should know, as should the people around him, that Putin’s primary focus remains the prevention of NATO expansion near Russia’s borders, and not the escalation of conflict in the Balkans after three years of exhausting war in Ukraine, which would be demanding even for Russia.

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